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A tautological interpretation of Gödel's ontological
proof
William Heartspring
Abstract: Gödel's ontological proof is interpreted in a logically clear and sensible way
without empirical and theological implications - rendering it mostly tautological interpretation-
wise. Gödel's ontological argument thus cannot be said to prove existence of God. The real
value of Gödel's ontological proof lies on the modal collapse consequence.
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1 Introduction
What I would like to demonstrate here is that there are ways to interpret Gödel's onto-
logical proof that have formal logical and mathematical values, other than controversial
interpretations of proving some God. In fact, under the new interpretation, Gödel's onto-
logical proof will be shown to be largely obvious and tautological. The real value of the
proof lies on its modal collapse outcome, not on other theorems.
2 Gödel's ontological proof
First, formal axioms of Gödel's ontological proof in higher-order modal logic presented by
Dana Scott[1] as a reﬁnement of Gödel's original axioms:
Ax. 1. (P (ϕ) ∧  ∀x(ϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x))) ⇒ P (ψ)
Ax. 2. P (¬ϕ) ⇔ ¬P (ϕ)
Th. 1. P (ϕ) ⇒ ♦ ∃x ϕ(x)
Df. 1. G(x) ⇔ ∀ϕ(P (ϕ)⇒ ϕ(x))
Ax. 3. P (G)
Th. 2. ♦ ∃x G(x)
Df. 2. ϕ ess x ⇔ ϕ(x) ∧ ∀ψ (ψ(x)⇒  ∀y(ϕ(y)⇒ ψ(y)))
Ax. 4. P (ϕ) ⇒  P (ϕ)
Th. 3. G(x) ⇒ G ess x
Df. 3. NE(x) ⇔ ∀ϕ(ϕ ess x⇒  ∃y ϕ(y))
Ax. 5. P (NE)
Th. 4.  ∃x G(x)
We will assume Axiom K and B of modal logic (for proving Th. 1 to Th. 4) and Axiom T
(for proving complete modal collapse from weaker modal collapses)[2].
 1 
3 Analysis of the proof
The fundamental question surrounding this proof is how we should interpret P . Of course
it is possible to attach any meaning to P and G as some would say, but this is largely
missing the mark. The real problem is how plausible and natural provided interpretations
of P and G are. We may say P is probability-like or phone-like or what, but no one would
say that these interpretations make sense. Thus valid criticisms of Gödel's ontological proof
either provide sensible interpretations of P or deny axioms. It is the former - providing an
alternative sensible interpretation of P - that I will carry out. It will also provide a natural
motivation behind the axioms.
In a way, the strategy for the sensible interpretation is obvious: we take cues from the
theorems derived - especially Th. 1, because it is the only theorem presented above that
involves only P , not G.
Th. 1 says that if a ϕ satisﬁes P , then there must be y in at least one world that satisﬁes
ϕ. Thus, we say that P is about predicate ϕ having satisfying y in at least one world. With
this partial reading of P , a part of Ax. 1 comes to make sense: if ϕ(y) ⇒ ψ(y) in some
world, then if ϕ(y) in some world, then ψ may satisfy P .
What then requires an additional deﬁnition of P is that Ax. 1 requires that in order for
ψ(x) to be conﬁrmed to satisfy P from ϕ satisfying P , ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x) for all x, not just
for x = y, and this holds for all world. Thus, a predicate satisﬁes P if its satisfaction is
a logical consequence of satisfaction of a predicate that is known to satisfy P , and that
such an antecedent-consequent relationship holds for all worlds. Ax. 4 suggests that if a
predicate satisﬁes P , then this must be the case for all worlds. These suggest the following
reading of P :
Criterion 1. In order for a predicate ϕ to satisfy P : P (ϕ), ϕ must have at least one
satisfaction in some world: ♦∃xϕ(x), but this does not have to be the case in all worlds -
and such fact is known to all worlds: P (ϕ)⇒ P (ϕ).
But it is possible that some predicates that satisfy Criterion 1 do not satisfy P . Criterion
1 is considered a necessary condition, as part of deﬁning P , for a predicate to satisfy P .
This is an important remark, because of Ax. 2, as will be explained below.
Criterion 2. If ∀xϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x) for all worlds, and ϕ satisﬁes P , then ψ satisﬁes P.
Criterion 3. By Ax. 2: only one of ϕ or ¬ϕ must satisfy P . And at least one of them has
to satisfy P .
These criteria provide one mean of constructing P that satisfy Ax. 1, Ax. 2 and (by
assuming) Ax. 4: pick one predicate ϕ that has one instance of satisfaction in some world
- let us pick one satisfying element y and use it as a reference, and label predicates that are
consequences of satisfaction of ϕ for all x and all worlds as satisfying P , along with ϕ itself.
This by procedure satisﬁes Ax. 1 and Ax. 4. Ax. 2 can easily be satisﬁed, if we relax the
construction mechanism: we simply choose predicates ψ that has ψ(y) in a reference world,
meaning y satisﬁes ψ in the reference world.
Let us use this deﬁnition of P : it checks whether a predicate can be satisﬁed by element y
in some reference world. With this deﬁnition, Ax. 3 means G(y) in some reference world,
which is tautological by deﬁnition of G(x) in Df. 1. Ax. 4 is really an assumption: it
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means that all worlds know how the reference world behaves with regards to element y. It
is somewhat like common knowledge in game theory.
Now Ax. 5: that necessary existence NE must be chosen to satisfy P (NE). It may seem
that we could simply set ϕ = NE and forget about Ax. 5. But because of the way P is
deﬁned, this means: ♦∃xNE(x).
The main question thus becomes: is there an object of necessary existence in at least some
world? Once we accept this, we arrive at Th. 4: for any world, some z that satisﬁes all
predicates with satisfying element y in the reference world exists.
In other words, we can form the new deﬁnition for P : ﬁrst, identify some reference worldW
where an element of necessary existence exists, and call the element y. Label all predicates
that can be satisﬁed by y in W . This deﬁnition satisﬁes all axioms, arriving at exact same
theorems. And interpreted this way, the theorems (Th. 1 to Th. 4) are largely boring -
they are by the deﬁnition true.
3.1 Summary
We provided an interpretation into P (so-called positiveness) such that P (ϕ) is true if
ϕ(y) is true for pre-given (pre-ﬁxed) element y in some pre-ﬁxed reference world. G(x) (so-
called God-like) thus refers to x having all properties (satisfying predicates) that pre-ﬁxed
y satisfy in the pre-ﬁxed reference world.
Df. 1 (which is the only deﬁnition involving either P or G), Ax. 1, Ax. 2 and Ax. 4
become tautological by the above interpretation. Ax. 3 is also tautological as far as element
y does exist and satisﬁes at least one predicate. But Ax. 5 is required to ﬁnally prove Th.
4, which says that for all worlds, there exists element x that satisﬁes all properties that y
satisfy in the reference world. Thus we have to ask whether an object of necessary existence
exists in at least one possible world. Furthermore, Ax. 5 dictates that our y is an object of
necessary existence.
4 The actual value of the proof is modal collapse
What is not boring, then, is the complete modal collapse outcome[1] that is the theorem of
the axioms provided. So far the deﬁnition does not directly provide hints that the complete
modal collapse has to occur, but it has to be. We just asserted that there exists an object
of necessary existence, and we eliminated needs for modal logic. The deﬁnition for P is
largely innocuous, so would not have provided much power.
Would this be the reason to deny an object of necessary existence? The question is in
fact far more complicated than what may be initially suggested - note that we have not
provided some concrete deﬁnition of what element or object means. Instead of ordinary
objects, an object may be some truth. We may say that NE(Ts) represents necessary
existence of some truth. There is nothing so far in the axioms and deﬁnitions that prevent
such interpretations. Analytic philosophy has spawned massive studies based on ideas of
necessary truth, so, that we can arrive at complete modal collapse outcome somewhat easily
is a startling discovery, even when acknowledging that deﬁnitions of necessary do diﬀer from
one philosopher or logician to another.
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In this form, Gödel's ontological proof gains another life other than proving God - it provides
means of reﬂections for current progress of analytic philosophy, gives directions and hints
for what deﬁnitions we should adopt and what conclusions we should support.
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